Domestic Law and Policy
To date, there is no specific legislation for Singpass and Singapore’s National Digital Identity (NDI) system. Instead, the system functions within an existing legislative framework governed by the following laws[25] – The Public Sector (Governance) Act (2018), which covers, among other areas, the management of data by government agencies, including personal data protection and data sharing[26]; The Personal Data Protection Act (2012) (PDPA) which provides a baseline standard for protection of personal data by the private sector in Singapore[27]; The National Registration Act (1965), underpins Singapore’s foundational ID system, on which the digital identity system is built[28]; and The Electronic Transactions Act, which establishes and regulates trustworthy digital certification services in Singapore.[29]
There is no specific definition of digital identity within Singapore’s domestic laws. However, Singpass‘s ‘Terms of Use’ describes it as ‘the electronic identification, authentication, or authorisation service of the Government of Singapore known as ‘Singpass’ through such Devices, websites, channels or platforms, as may be designated by us from time to time.’[30]
Singpass is linked with foundational identity systems such as the NRIC or FIN that prove citizenship or residency status. The digital identity by itself is not a proof of citizenship, rather a proof of residency status in the country.[31] When applying for citizenship, Singpass is required in order to access and complete the application processes.[32]
Individuals whose digital ID data is misused, lost, or mishandled can file complaints with the Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC), which investigates, enforces penalties, and can order rectification.[33] Individuals can also submit complaints to GovTech or the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, both of which have formal feedback and escalation channels.[34] Data breaches, identity theft, or disputes relating to transactions via Singpass are subject to investigation and enforcement under both PDPA and relevant criminal legislation.[35] It is important to note that PDPA does not ordinarily apply to “public agencies” when they collect personal data to carry out public functions.[36] Since Singpass is operated by the government, much of the personal data processed via Singpass is handled by public agencies in their official capacity; therefore, a significant volume of data-processing activities tend to be outside the PDPA’s regulatory remit.[37]
Data Protection
Singapore’s data protection framework is one of the most established in the region. It is built on a model that draws a clear distinction between private sector and public sector obligations. The key data protection law in Singapore is the PDPA: it provides a baseline standard of protection for personal data in Singapore. It complements sector-specific legislative and regulatory frameworks such as those related to banking and insurance. It comprises various requirements governing the collection, use, disclosure and care of personal data.[38]
The PDPA does not expressly address the NDI. The Singpass Terms of Use, however, refer to the PDPA and specify that “personal data” carries the same meaning as in the PDPA.[39] Accordingly, data protection in the use of Singpass is regulated by the Singpass Privacy Statement, interpreted alongside the Terms of Use, and is ultimately subject to the overarching framework of the PDPA.[40]
The PDPA’s provisions also extends to biometric data. According to the Singapore government’s FAQs about Singpass, the application collects biometric data and any data retained is encrypted in storage and protected with tamper-evident logging. The government also deletes data that is no longer required; however, no specified timeframe is stipulated regarding when data should be removed.[41] The collected biometric data is encrypted and generally, Singpass requires authentication for access to any service. As the authentication is backed by encryption technologies and security safeguards,[42] the government does have access to this data.[43] Singpass authentication uses biometric facial verification through the MyInfo platform and app-based features, but there is limited publicly available information on data retention, access, and sharing between agencies. The data that the government has access to includes biometrics, personal data, information on devices and may extend to other information that is collected from the individual in using their Singpass and Singpass materials.[44] As per information available, when a service (government or private) seeks to retrieve data via MyInfo, the user must authenticate access (via Singpass) and explicitly consent to that data sharing.[45]
There is no evidence of direct violations of rights around privacy or surveillance in connection with the use of data obtained through Singpass and Singapore’s NDI system on stateless persons, refugees, or migrant populations. However, there has been criticism of Singapore’s ubiquitous technology-fuelled surveillance of its residents.[46] While Singapore maintains a comprehensive private-sector data protection law, the lack of independent oversight for government-held digital identity data presents challenges for accountability and rights protection.
International Commitments
Singapore has not ratified the ICCPR, ICESCR, the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions, nor the Refugee Convention. However, the country has acceded to CEDAW, CRC and UNCRPD.[47] In particular, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has elaborated the rights of children in digital environments. General Comment No. 25 by the Committee advocates for the creation of digital systems that enable all children to safely access essential digital public services and educational services without discrimination.[48] There is risk that stateless children in Singapore may face exclusion from public services and education due to the lack of access to Singpass. This raises concerns regarding the full realization of obligations under CRC along with the principle of non-discrimination, under Article 7 of the UDHR.[49] Furthermore, since Singapore is not a party to the GDPR, it is not privy to other binding international commitments with respect to digital ID systems.
The ASEAN Framework on Personal Data Protection and Framework on Digital Data Governance sets out non-binding principles encouraging member states to adopt national data protection laws and supports mutual recognition. However, it does not impose binding commitments or specific mandates on digital ID systems or make provisions for the protection of stateless persons.[50]